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Risk aversion and effort in an
incentive pay scheme with
multiplicative noise: Theory and
experimental evidence
Nick Zubanov∗
Abstract
This study applies the classical “linear” model of incentive pay
to the case when the noise to output multiplies with effort, de-
riving two propositions: 1) given the strength of incentives, more
risk-averse workers will put in less effort, and 2) a performance
target will weaken the negative risk aversion–effort link. The data
from a real-effort laboratory experiment involving N = 85 stu-
dent participants support both propositions. Implications of the
model and empirical findings to the literature on, and practice
of, personnel management are discussed.
JEL: M52; J33; C91
Keywords: risk aversion, incentive pay, performance targets.
1 Introduction
Worker risk aversion is known to be an important factor affecting the
design of incentive pay schemes and their effectiveness. For one thing,
greater dislike of risk requires higher compensation for a given exposure
to it (Prendergast, 2000), implying that more risk-averse workers are less
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likely to be found in incentive pay jobs, as has been confirmed empirically
in Bellemare and Shearer (2010) and Grund and Sliwka (2010). Second,
higher risk aversion by the worker implies lower optimal strength of
incentives offered to him by the firm (Lazear and Gibbs, 2009, p. 289),
resulting in lower effort. However, since sorting of people into jobs is
never perfect, workers with varying risk preferences are often observed
in jobs giving the same exposure to financial risk through a standard
incentive pay scheme applying to all in a given firm. As workers want
to strike a balance between their expected earnings and exposure to risk
as befits their risk preferences, will there be any systematic differences
in their performance linked to their risk aversion? This study presents a
simple model (Section 2) predicting this link in one often occurring case,
and tests it by running a laboratory experiment.
At first sight, this link may seem superfluous. In the classical “lin-
ear” incentive pay model (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987) with a fixed
incentive strength and the noise to outcome of the worker’s effort ad-
ditive and independent of the worker’s actions, the dislike of this noise
should not affect the optimal effort choice. Indeed, experimental results
in Sloof and van Praag (2008) suggest that, holding incentive strength
fixed, effort is independent of the additive noise variance. However, the
variance of the noise to outcome is often not independent on the agent’s
actions, implying that risk preferences will be among factor affecting the
optimal effort. In particular, when the noise is multiplicative in effort,
optimal effort will decrease with agent’s risk aversion. An example of
such “multiplicative noise” case is the work of a sales agent who con-
tacts potential customers for a deal, earning a commission for each deal,
and succeeds with a certain probability at each contact. Intuitively, the
more contacts he makes, the higher his expected earnings are, but so is
their variance, implying that agents with a greater dislike for earnings
variance will optimally choose to make fewer contacts.
To my knowledge, the only empirical evidence to support this intu-
ition is available in Cadsby, Song and Tapon (2009). Running a labora-
tory experiment involving 115 economics undergraduate students paid
for solving word anagrams, they find that more risk-averse participants
report lower improvement in performance once the payment scheme is
switched from a fixed fee to pay per anagram solved. In fact, a quar-
ter of their participants did worse after the payment scheme switch.
This study features an experiment that is similar in spirit to Cadsby et
al.’s (2009) but differs from it as explained in Section 3. The findings
from this experiment, too, show that more risk-averse participants put
in lower effort under an incentive pay scheme with multiplicative noise,
and that this negative risk aversion–effort link is powerful enough to
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bring performance gains from incentive pay to naught.
What can be done to restore the promised efficiency gains from in-
centive pay in the multiplicative noise case? A solution proposed in this
study is to weaken the risk aversion–effort link by introducing the min-
imum output requirement (MOR), whereby commissions are paid only
if the actual output is at or above a specified target. The intuition
behind the effect of MOR is that, compared to the case of no MOR,
it increases the marginal utility of effort when effort is relatively low,
compelling more risk-averse agents to work harder. The experimental
results (Section 4) support this intuition: the negative relationship be-
tween risk aversion and effort becomes significantly weaker as MOR is
introduced, as more risk-averse experiment participants start to put in
relatively higher effort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section intro-
duces a model of incentive pay with multiplicative noise to effort, deriv-
ing the relationships between risk aversion and optimal effort without
and with MOR and illustrating them numerically. Section 3 contains the
details of the real-effort experiment set to test this model, and reports
some descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups. Section
4 presents the empirical model designed to fit the experimental data,
and reports the estimation results from it. Section 5 concludes with a
discussion of the results and relates them to the existing literature and
practice of personnel management.
2 A model of incentive pay with multiplicative noise
Consider a worker doing a standard repetitive task, such as the work of a
sales agent given as an example in the introduction, each attempt having
a certain probability of success γ¯. The worker earns a fixed wage B plus
a commission depending on the actual number of successes, S = γx (the
monetary value of a commission per unit of value is normalized to 1),
where x is the number of attempts and γ ∈ [0, 1] is the empirical success
frequency. The dispersion of γ around its expectation γ¯ introduces noise
to output which is multiplicative to worker’s effort, hence the name
of the model. Indeed, the variance of earnings is xγ¯(1 − γ¯), which is
increasing with effort. The worker can choose any x starting from a
certain minimum x0. The firm can only observe and enforce this x0, but
not any effort above it; therefore, the firm contracts on the output S
rather than effort.
I assume that the worker’s utility function is increasing and con-
cave in total earnings, B + γx, with a constant absolute risk aversion
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(CARA)1, and that his cost of effort, c(x), is a monotonically increasing
and convex function of x. Approximating the discrete distribution of
the success frequency γ with a continuous one for large x, the worker’s
expected utility net of effort costs is specified as follows:
U(x) =
1∫
0
1− e−δ(B+γx)
δ
dF (γ)− c(x), c′(x) > 0, c′′(x) > 0 (1)
Here δ is the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion (higher δ means
greater risk aversion, negative δ means risk loving) and F (γ) is the cumu-
lative distribution function of γ, which converges to normal with mean
γ¯ and standard deviation
√
γ¯(1−γ¯)
x
as x becomes large. I further assume
that the cost of effort function c(x) is steep enough for an optimal level
of effort x∗ <∞, maximizing (1), to exist.
It is convenient to “standardize” success frequency γ, using
z =
√
x
γ − γ¯√
γ¯(1− γ¯) ∼ N(0, 1),
instead of γ in the utility function (1). Then F (γ) = Φ(z), where Φ(·)
is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. The utility
function (1) redefined in terms of z becomes
U(x) =
∞∫
−∞
1− e−δ(B+z
√
xγ¯(1−γ¯)+γ¯x)
δ
dΦ(z)− c(x) (2)
The optimal effort level x∗ maximizing (2) is determined from the fol-
lowing first-order condition:
U′(x) =
∞∫
−∞
e−δ(B+z
√
x∗γ¯(1−γ¯)+γ¯x∗)
(
z
√
γ¯(1− γ¯)
2
√
x∗
+ γ¯
)
dΦ(z)
−c′(x∗) = 0 (3)
1The theoretical results for the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function, available from the author, are weaker but still hold for reasonable values of
the decision parameters.
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Differentiating x∗ in (3) with respect to δ gives:
dx∗
dδ
= −
∞∫
−∞
e−δ(B+z
√
x∗γ¯(1−γ¯)+γ¯x∗)
(
z
√
γ¯(1−γ¯)
2
√
x∗ + γ¯
)(
B + z
√
x∗γ¯(1− γ¯) + γ¯x∗
)
dΦ(z)
∞∫
−∞
e−δ(B+z
√
x∗γ¯(1−γ¯)+γ¯x∗)
[
δ
(
z
√
γ¯(1−γ¯)
2
√
x∗ + γ¯
)2
+
z
√
γ¯(1−γ¯)
4x∗
√
x∗
]
dΦ(z) + c′′(x∗)
(4)
The sign of
dx∗
dδ
in (4) is always negative. Hence, the first hypothesis of
this study:
Hypothesis 1: For a given incentive pay contract with multiplicative
noise, optimal effort x∗ decreases with risk aversion.
Intuitively, in an incentive pay model where the noise to output is
multiplicative in effort, the optimal effort level should decrease with
risk aversion because higher effort creates extra uncertainty which is
the more costly to bear the more risk-averse a worker is. In contrast,
when the noise is additive to, and statistically independent of, effort,
the uncertainty it creates is independent of the worker’s actions. In fact,
any additive and independent noise component to the utility function
(2) can be separated from effort by factoring it out of the integral, and
thus will not affect the first-order conditions determining x∗. Sloof and
van Praag (2008, pp. 796-798) provide analytical results supporting this
statement. I therefore abstract from additive noise in the model as well
as in the experiment designed to test it.
2.1 Minimum output requirement
With minimum output requirement (MOR), the worker receives fixed
wage plus commissions, B+γx, if the number of successes is at or above
a certain minimum output level y0 > 0:
γx = z
√
xγ¯(1− γ¯) + γ¯x ≥ y0
Failing this, he receives only fixed wage B. His expected utility function
then becomes
UMOR(x) =
z¯(x)∫
−∞
1− e−δB
δ
dΦ(z) +
∞∫
z¯(x)
1− e−δ(B+z
√
xγ¯(1−γ¯)+γ¯x)
δ
dΦ(z)− c(x)
= U(x)− A(x), (5)
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where z¯(x) = (y0 − γ¯x) /
√
xγ¯(1− γ¯) is the minimum of the standard-
ized success frequency at which MOR is met given the level of effort x,
and the term
A(x) =
z¯(x)∫
−∞
e−δB − e−δ(B+z
√
xγ¯(1−γ¯)+γ¯x)
δ
dΦ(z) (6)
can be interpreted the expected utility loss from failing to meet MOR
despite trying.
Three facts are true about A(x):
1. A(x) > 0 for all x0 ≤ x < ∞, since for these values of x the
expression under the integral sign in (6) is negative.
2. limx→∞A(x) = 0, since limx→∞ z¯(x) = −∞.
3. A(x) is monotonic in x as long as the probability of meeting MOR
increases with x at a faster rate than does the disutility of effort. This
happens whenever the curvature of the cumulative distribution function
Φ(z) at z = z¯(x) is steeper than that of
(
e−δB − e−δ(B+y0)) /δ (the value
of the expression under integral in (6) at z = z¯(x)), and in particular
when y0 is close to the expected number of successes given the effort
without MOR, x∗γ¯.
These three facts taken together imply that A′(x) < 0 and A′′(x) > 0.
Given (5), A′(x) < 0 further implies that for the optimal effort level
without MOR, x∗, derived from (3), U′(x∗) − A′(x∗) = −A′(x∗) > 0.
Therefore, the optimal level of effort with MOR, x∗m, will exceed x
∗.
Finally, given that A′(x∗m) = − (U′(x∗m)− U′(x∗)), the convexity and
monotonicity of A(x) implies that the difference between x∗m and x
∗
decreases with x∗, that is
d(x∗m − x∗)
dx∗
=
dx∗m
dδ
− dx∗
dδ
dx∗
dδ
< 0 (7)
Recalling from (4) that dx∗/dδ < 0, inequality (7) implies:
dx∗m
dδ
− dx
∗
dδ
> 0
Hence the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: For a given incentive pay contract without MOR, the
introduction of MOR will weaken the negative relationship between effort
and risk aversion.
For the intuition behind Hypothesis 2, consider how the introduction
of MOR changes the levels of effort previously chosen by two workers:
WHL with low risk aversion (high effort), and W
L
H with high risk aversion
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(low effort). For the hard-working WHL , there is almost no change, since
his effort practically guaranties a fulfillment of MOR. On the other hand,
the relatively low effort that WLH used to put in exposes him to a higher
expected utility loss A(x) from not meeting MOR, compelling him to
increase effort to reduce the probability of incurring this loss.
Hypothesis 2 will apply only to the workers who still choose to par-
ticipate in the contract when MOR is introduced. In the case of the
optimal, profit-maximizing incentive pay contract without MOR, the
participation constraint will be binding for the least productive worker
who will make the minimum acceptable effort x0. As MOR is introduced,
this worker and those near him in effort (the cut-off effort level depends
on y0) will pull out of the contract, since for these workers the utility
from participation will fall below their reservation utility by −A(x) < 0.
Thus, similar to the incentive pay model with additive noise as tested
in Lazear (2000), the introduction of MOR is expected to result in i)
the departure of the least productive workers, and ii) an increase in the
effort by the workers for whom it is still profitable to remain in the firm.
However, in what follows I will abstract from MOR’s effect on partici-
pation (the experimental sample size is not enough to test it anyway)
and concentrate on the risk aversion–effort link in the case when par-
ticipation is continued. The experimental setting in which I test the
hypotheses derived from the model will help ensure participation.
2.2 Numerical solutions for optimal effort
This section reports numerical solutions for the worker’s optimal effort
levels x∗ (no MOR) and x∗m (MOR) as functions of risk aversion, to
help visualize the effects of risk aversion that the model predicts under
these two regimes.2 The parameters of the utility functions (2) and
(5), underlying the solutions, are listed in Table 1. The values of the
probability of success (γ¯), fixed wage (B) and minimum acceptable effort
and output requirement (x0 and y0) are the same as in the experiment
(next Section 3). The range of the risk aversion parameter δ is restricted
to be above 0, to guarantee the existence of an optimal solution given
the parameters of the cost function. These parameters have been chosen
so that the optimal solution without MOR, x∗, corresponding to the
average risk aversion level in the experiment’s treatment group is close
to its empirical counterpart.
Figure 1 plots logarithms of optimal effort levels without and with
MOR as functions of risk aversion calculated from their respective first-
order conditions given the parameters in Table 1. More risk-averse work-
ers optimally put in lower effort under both regimes. However, with
2The Matlab code for the numerical solutions is available on request.
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Table 1: Parameters underlying numerical solutions for optimal effort
levels without and with MOR
Parameter Value
The probability of success, γ¯ 0.25
Cost function: c(x) = aebx
a 10−6
b 0.35
Fixed wage, B 0
Minimum output requirement, y0 8
Minimum acceptable effort, x0 0
Risk aversion parameter, δ [0; 1]
MOR the effort is higher for all levels of risk aversion, and increasingly
so for more risk-averse workers, resulting in a weakening of the risk
aversion-effort link observed in the absence of MOR. Conveniently, the
log effort-risk aversion link is linear to a good degree of approximation,
permitting empirical estimation of this link with a simple linear regres-
sion.
3 The experiment and the data
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 empirically, an experiment was run at Tilburg
University in The Netherlands. The experiment consisted of an instruc-
tions session (5 minutes), an unpaid training round (3 minutes) and two
paid-for rounds (5 minutes each) with a five-minute break in between
and afterwards, followed by a questionnaire on risk aversion which took
a few minutes to fill in. Altogether, the experiment lasted about 45
minutes, including the time it took to allocate the participants to their
seats in the computer lab and to disburse the earnings. 85 participants
(54 women and 31 men, average age 23 years), all humanities and social
science students, were recruited locally through advertisements put up
in public areas. The participants were randomly assigned to the con-
trol group, receiving a fixed pay for participation in each round of the
experiment, and the treatment group, receiving payment depending on
their performance at the experimental task. The full details of the ex-
periment, including the instructions and the forms, are available in the
Appendix.
The experimental task was to find the word on a specified page,
line and position in a piece of printed text, and to enter it into an
electronic form created for each round. Once the word was entered, the
computer program behind the experiment would determine whether the
8
Figure 1: The theoretical link between log optimal effort and risk aver-
sion with and without MOR.
entry was correct and assign a payment to each participant in each round.
Participants in the control group received a fixed pay of e1.50 per round,
irrespective of the number of words they entered. Those in the treatment
group were paid per word, earning e0.20 with probability 0.25, and zero
with probability 0.75. This method of payment, implemented using a
built-in random numbers generator, mimics the incentive pay scheme
with multiplicative noise in which pay uncertainty increases with effort.
To avoid satisficing, the participants were not informed how many words
they entered correctly or, for the treatment group, how many of them
were “winning” (i.e., carrying the e0.20 reward) until the very end of
the experiment.
The payment rules for the treatment group participants differed by
round. During the first paid-for round (round 1), they were paid for
every winning word, as workers would be paid in the model without
MOR. During round 2, they got paid only if the number of winning
words was equal or exceeded 8, as in the MOR case studied in Section
2.1.
Two differences between the experimental designs in this study and
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Cadsby et al.’s (2009) are worth mentioning. The first difference is
in the experimental task. Word inputting, to my knowledge, has not
been used in experimental work before. Yet, it suits the purpose of the
experiment well, since performance on this task, while requiring effort,
does not depend on ability as much as anagram solving does, allowing
more easily to abstract from this potentially confounding factor. The
second difference lies in the payment rule, which was implemented in
Cadsby et al. (2009) as a payment per anagram solved. The basic
feature of an incentive pay scheme under which a negative risk aversion–
effort link may exist is multiplicative noise. The uncertainty in the time
it takes to solve an anagram does result in the earnings uncertainty
increasing with effort (see the concluding section 5 for an example).
However, paying per unit of task with a given probability, as is done in
my experiment, is a more “clean” way of modeling the risk aversion–
effort link, since it guarantees that earnings uncertainty will depend on
effort, not ability.
Risk aversion, the key explanatory variable in this study, was mea-
sured using the menu of lottery choices developed in Holt and Laury
(2002) at the end of round 2. Participants were asked to choose between
a safe (low variance) and a risky (high variance) options in ten lottery
decisions in which the difference in expected values of the risky and the
safe options increased progressively. The expected values of lottery pay-
ments were of a similar magnitude to the earnings in the experimental
rounds. I use the number of chosen safe options as the measure of the de-
gree of risk aversion in the statistical analysis to follow.3 To incentivize
participants to give honest answers, one of the ten lottery decisions was
picked at random and the option chosen by a participant in that deci-
sion was played to him or her. Together with the winnings from this
lottery and a show-up fee of e1.50, the average earnings in the control
and treatment groups were e6.3 and e7, respectively.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables of the ex-
periment by group. The participants, mostly women in their mid twen-
ties, exhibit an average attitude to risk close to neutrality. The aver-
age number of safe choices, about 4, is somewhat lower than a mildly
risk-averse 5.17 reported by Holt and Laury’s (2002) experiment partici-
pants when confronted with lottery payments of a comparable monetary
value.4 There is considerable variation in the reported number of safe
3One could also recover intervals of the direct measure of risk aversion, δ, con-
sistent with the stated lottery preferences and use the midpoint in each interval as
an alternative measure of risk aversion. The results with this measure (available on
request) are qualitatively the same.
4The average number of safe choices in the Holt and Laury experiment was cal-
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choices spanning from 0 to 7 in the control group, and from 0 to 9 in
the treatment group.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics by group
Control group, N = 43
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Pairwise correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Total words round 1 35.39 7.410 1
2. Total words round 2 36.186 5.799 0.789 1
3. Risk aversion 3.884 1.096 -0.012 -0.203 1
4. Age in years 22.714 2.690 0.056 -0.096 0.160 1
5. Gender (1 = female) 0.558 0.502 -0.112 -0.159 0.207 0.334 1
Treatment group, N = 42
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Pairwise correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Total words round 1 34.690 7.779 1
2. Total words round 2 37.119 6.078 0.821 1
3. Risk aversion 4.452 2.086 -0.603 -0.274 1
4. Age in years 24.071 2.168 -0.172 -0.400 -0.002 1
5. Gender (1 = female) 0.714 0.457 -0.108 -0.295 0.062 0.243 1
The measure of effort I use is the total number of words entered (there
were few incorrect entries). It averages at about 35 words for both groups
in round 1 and then increases a little, to 36 in the control group and to 37
in the treatment group. It shows correlations with risk aversion mostly
consistent with my theory: negative (-0.6) in the treatment group in the
no-MOR round 1, negative but weaker in the same group in the MOR
round 2 (-0.27), and insignificant in the control group in round 1. A small
but hard to ignore negative correlation between effort and risk aversion in
the control group in round 2 (-0.2) suggests that more risk averse people
tend to get tired more quickly. The relationship between risk aversion
and fatigue is outside my model but it may affect the estimation results
as I explain below.
The similarity between average effort levels across groups and treat-
ments is surprising, since it is only the treatment group whose perfor-
mance was incentivized. The nature of the experimental task, which
might have been regarded by some participants as mildly entertaining,
may be one explanation; however, other factors closer to the interest
of this study are likely to be at work as well. Thus, even though the
culated based on the results reported Table 3 in their 2002 article.
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allocation of participants into groups was random, the treatment group
happens to be, on average, more risk-averse than control: 4.45 vs. 3.88,
though this difference is statistically insignificant. There is also a large
negative correlation between risk aversion and effort in the treatment
group, consistent with the model. Further analysis will show that these
two factors together have lowered the treatment group’s average effort,
bringing it close to that of the un-incentivized control group.
The improvement in the treatment group’s average effort in round 2
relative to round 1, though consistent with the theory, is modest. While
there were no cases of a steep decline in effort that would suggest a refusal
to participate, fatigue might have negatively affected effort in round 2.
If fatigue is unrelated to risk aversion, its average effect will be part of
the constant term without causing a bias to the regression estimates.
However, looking at the correlations between risk aversion and effort in
the control group, it seems that more risk-averse participants are more
prone to fatigue. If this is the case, there will be a downward bias in the
estimated effect of risk aversion on effort in round 2, making Hypothesis
2 harder to test.
4 Econometric specification and regression results
In principle, one could treat the first-order conditions for the optimal ef-
fort levels with and without MOR, x∗m and x
∗, as implicit functions of risk
aversion, and estimate their parameters from the data using nonlinear
least squares. However, making statistical inferences from the results of
this procedure will be difficult, since there is no structurally comparable
model for the control group. As a simpler and more direct way of test-
ing the predictions of my model, I approximate the relationship between
the logarithm of effort and risk aversion as a linear regression, allowing
its parameters to vary between the treatment and control groups. The
numerical solutions presented in Section 2.2 show that log-linear is in-
deed a good approximation for the effort-risk aversion link implied by
the theory.
To test my hypotheses, I regress the logarithm of effort in rounds 1
and 2 on the risk aversion measure (the number of safe options in the
Holt and Laury lottery), the treatment group dummy, the cross product
between the two, and age and gender added as controls:
ln(total wordsround 1i ) = β
round 1
0 + β
round 1
1 treatmenti + β
round 1
2 (risk aversion i)
+βround 13 treatmenti × (risk aversion i)
+βround 14 agei + β
round 1
5 genderi + u
round 1
i , (8)
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ln(total wordsround 2i ) = β
round 2
0 + β
round 2
1 treatmenti + β
round 2
2 (risk aversion i)
+βround 23 treatmenti × (risk aversion i)
+βround 24 agei + β
round 2
5 genderi + u
round 2
i , (9)
where uround 1i , u
round 2
i are the error terms. Coefficient β
round 1
3 is the text
statistic for Hypothesis 1; it measures the difference between the effect
of risk aversion on effort in the treatment group, where it is supposed to
matter, and the control group, where such link is not expected. Though
not part of my theory, a correlation between risk aversion and effort
may exist in the control group as well, for instance, due to cognitive
ability affecting both effort and risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2010).
Coefficients βround 12 , β
round 2
2 measure this correlation in the respective
rounds. Lastly, expression βround 11 + β
round 1
3 × risk aversion i and its
corresponding expression in round 2 measure the effects of incentive pay
on effort. Clearly, if β3 6= 0, these effects differ with risk aversion.
The test statistic for Hypothesis 2 (MOR weakens the negative re-
lationship between risk aversion and effort) is βround 23 − βround 13 , which
is the difference between the effects of risk aversion on effort in round
2 (MOR) and round 1 (no MOR) estimated from equations (9) and
(8) respectively. Note that, given the adopted, linear, regression spec-
ification, βround 23 − βround 13 also measures the effect of risk aversion on
the effort increase caused by MOR.5 To calculate the standard error
of this statistic, the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients βround 23
and βround 13 is needed. I obtain this matrix by estimating equations (8)
and (9) simultaneously, using Zellner’s (1962) method of seemingly un-
related regressions. Since the regressors in both equations are identical,
this method produces exactly the same results as ordinary least squares
(OLS) applied to each equation separately (Greene, 2003, pp. 343-344).
Table 3 reports results for equations (8) and (9) estimated jointly in
specifications with and without controls. All controls are individually
insignificant and their inclusion makes little difference to the estimates
of main interest. As expected, there is no significant link between risk
aversion and effort in the control group (coefficients βround 12 and β
round 2
2 ).
In the treatment group, however, the link is negative. The test statistic
5The equation linking effort increase to risk aversion,
ln
(
total words round 2
total words round 1
)
i
= β˜0 + β˜1treatmenti + β˜2(risk aversioni)
+β˜3treatmenti × (risk aversioni)
+β˜4agei + β˜5genderi + u˜i,
where x˜ = xround 2 − xround 1, is derived by subtracting equation (8) from (9) part
by part. The treatment effect is β˜3 ≡ βround 23 − βround 13 .
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for Hypothesis 1, βround 13 , is estimated at about −0.08, and is significant,
supporting the prediction that effort under a linear incentive pay scheme
with multiplicative noise decreases with risk aversion. The test statistics
for Hypothesis 2, βround 23 − βround 13 is also about 0.08 in magnitude and
is strongly significant. Hence, the existence of the MOR reduces, in fact
neutralises, the negative risk aversion-effort link observed without it.
This link weakens because more risk-averse participants increase their
effort by a greater margin (8% with a unit increase in risk aversion, or
about 0.6 of its standard deviation) than do less risk-averse ones. Re-
calling that more risk-averse participants may have reduced their effort
because of experiencing greater fatigue, this estimate is likely to be a
conservative one.
Having confirmed both hypotheses, let us examine what the risk
aversion–effort link means to the effect of incentive pay on effort. Al-
though the treatment dummy itself has a large positive and significant
coefficient in round 1 (βround 11 ), the treatment effect is greatly reduced
by the negative risk aversion–effort link specific to the treatment group.
In fact, the treatment effect for the average participant in round 1
(βround 11 + β
round 1
3 × average risk aversion in Table 3) is almost zero,
suggesting that the negative risk aversion–effort link is powerful enough
to bring performance gains from incentive pay to naught. The situation
improves, albeit slightly, in round 2, where the MOR is introduced. In
that round, the treatment effect for the average participant is 0.042-0.059
and is on the brink of statistical significance. It is, again, a conservative
estimate, since the treatment group, more risk-averse on average, may
have experienced greater fatigue than the control group. Thus, there are
signs that the MOR could restore the efficiency of incentive pay schemes.
5 Discussion and conclusion
Let us take stock of the findings and relate them to the wider literature
and the practice of personnel management. The model presented in this
study predicts that risk aversion will affect individual choice of effort in
the multiplicative noise case, when the noise to output and effort are
not independent (Hypothesis 1). Only limited scholarship exists on this
case. Yet, it is important practically, applying whenever each individual
instance of effort succeeds with a certain probability, such as in the sales
agent example in the introduction. Another example, more relevant to
the case of MOR to which we return below, is that of a tenure tracker
who receives a tenure if the amount of his published research exceeds a
certain minimum.
In fact, situations where noise to output is not independent of effort
abound and include cases when reward is certain and given per each
14
Table 3: Regression results for Hypotheses 1 and 2
Dependent variable: log total words round 1
(1) (2)
Treatment (βround 11 ) 0.326** 0.350**
(0.135) (0.138)
Risk aversion (βround 12 ) 0.002 0.006
(0.028) (0.028)
Treatment×Risk aversion (βround 13 ) -0.079** -0.084***
(0.032) (0.032)
Controls no yes
Dependent variable: log total words round 2
Treatment (βround 21 ) 0.017 0.072
(0.108) (0.106)
Risk aversion (βround 22 ) -0.033 -0.024
(0.022) (0.022)
Treatment×Risk aversion (βround 23 ) 0.006 -0.003
(0.025) (0.025)
Controls no yes
βround 11 + β
round 1
3 × average risk aversion -0.005 0.001
(0.044) (0.046)
βround 21 + β
round 2
3 × average risk aversion 0.042 0.059*
(0.035) (0.035)
βround 23 − βround 13 0.085*** 0.081***
(0.018) (0.018)
∗∗ - significant at 5%, ∗∗∗ - significant at 1%.
Standard errors for linear combinations of regression coefficients
are calculated using the coefficient variance-covariance matrices
estimated with seemingly unrelated regressions.
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attempt (as in Cadsby et al.’s (2009) experiment) but the length of time
per attempt varies randomly. For instance, going back to the sales agent
example, if the length of time it takes to talk to a customer is expo-
nentially distributed, the number of customers that can be contacted in
a working day follows Poisson distribution, with variance equal to the
mean equal to the expected number of customer contacts per day. That
is, even when paid per contact rather than per deal, agents who will
make more contacts will face higher earnings uncertainty.
The data from the real-effort laboratory experiment featured in this
study support Hypothesis 1, although further experiments, carried out
on a larger scale, are necessary to strengthen its empirical foundations.
The finding that effort tends to decrease with risk aversion will inform
personnel managers that efficiency gains from incentive pay schemes in
their firms may be limited by workers’ dislike of risk, which is in what
what is found from calculating the treatment effects for the average
participant. This finding speaks to the literature on the determinants
of incentive pay’s adoption by firms, especially with respect to non-
managerial employees (Lazear, 1986; Brown, 1990; Parent, 2002; Barth
et al., 2008), suggesting that workers’ risk aversion could be one of such
determinants, at least in the short run when sorting of people of different
risk preferences into jobs with different exposure to risk cannot complete.
The second hypothesis following from my model was that minimum
output requirement (MOR) should weaken the link between risk aver-
sion and effort, at least for the workers who will still participate. This
hypothesis, which also implies that MOR will cause workers to put in
the more additional effort, the more risk-averse they are, thus restoring
part of the incentive pay effect on performance, has been strongly sup-
ported by the experimental results. This finding relates to the literature
on incentive pay based on performance targets (Murphy, 2000; Ander-
son et al., 2010), helping to explain the existence of this rather popular
practice. The lesson for management is that performance targets can be
an effective tool for motivating workers, especially those economizing on
effort because of being risk-averse.
Is MOR economically efficient as well as effective? The utility loss
caused by the MOR requires compensation to keep the workers employed
at the firm, the more the higher their risk aversion. In my simple model,
a risk-neutral firm could weaken the negative risk aversion–effort link
more cheaply by replacing a random commission γ with its expectation,
γ¯, so as to remove the multiplicative noise component from incentive
pay. Doing so, however, may invite dysfunctional behavioral response in
a more complicated setting, whereby workers would maximize through-
put compromising on quality. Exploring behavioral responses and effi-
16
ciency implications of different compensation options within the context
of incentive pay model with multiplicative noise awaits further research.
17
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Appendix:	  Experimental	  procedures	  	  Section	  A1.	  Summary	  	  A	  real-­‐effort	  experiment	  involving	  85	  humanities	  and	  social	  science	  students	  was	  run	  at	  Tilburg	  University,	  The	  Netherlands,	  in	  two	  sessions:	  one	  in	  June,	  the	  other	  in	  September	  2011.	  Both	  sessions	  took	  place	  on	  the	  same	  day	  of	  the	  week	  (Wednesday)	  at	  11.00.	  A	  total	  of	  85	  participants	  (54	  women,	  31	  men,	  average	  age	  23	  years)	  were	  recruited	  locally	  through	  adverts	  placed	  in	  public	  areas	  and	  allocated	  randomly	  into	  the	  control	  (43	  participants)	  and	  treatment	  (42	  participants)	  groups.	  Each	  session	  had	  one	  control	  and	  one	  treatment	  group,	  seated	  in	  two	  separate	  computer	  rooms	  with	  at	  least	  one	  member	  of	  the	  experimental	  team	  in	  presence.	  The	  language	  of	  communication	  was	  English.	  	  	  The	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  an	  instructions	  session	  (5	  minutes),	  an	  unpaid	  training	  round	  (3	  minutes)	  and	  two	  paid-­‐for	  rounds	  (5	  minutes	  each)	  with	  a	  five-­‐minute	  break	  in	  between	  and	  afterwards,	  followed	  by	  a	  questionnaire	  on	  risk	  aversion	  which	  took	  at	  most	  5	  minutes.	  The	  duration	  of	  the	  rounds	  and	  the	  breaks	  was	  controlled	  automatically.	  The	  total	  duration	  of	  the	  experiment	  was	  about	  45	  minutes,	  including	  the	  arrival	  and	  reception	  and	  disbursement	  of	  earnings.	  The	  detailed	  schedule	  of	  the	  stages	  of	  the	  experiment	  is	  presented	  in	  Section	  A.2	  of	  this	  document.	  The	  participants	  were	  seated	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  one	  another	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  remain	  silent	  during	  the	  rounds	  and	  the	  breaks.	  	  	  The	  instructions	  to	  participants	  were	  communicated	  in	  the	  form	  of	  messages	  appearing	  on	  their	  computer	  screens.	  These	  instructions	  are	  given	  in	  Section	  A.3.	  The	  questionnaire	  on	  risk	  aversion	  is	  given	  in	  Section	  A.4.	  	  	  The	  experimental	  task	  was	  to	  find	  the	  word	  on	  a	  specified	  page,	  line	  and	  position	  in	  a	  piece	  of	  printed	  text,	  and	  to	  enter	  it	  into	  an	  Excel	  form	  created	  for	  each	  round.	  A	  fragment	  from	  the	  piece	  of	  text	  used	  in	  rounds	  1	  and	  2	  (the	  dry	  round	  had	  a	  separate	  piece	  of	  text),	  as	  it	  appeared	  to	  the	  participants,	  is	  given	  in	  Section	  A.5.	  Section	  A.6	  contains	  a	  screenshot	  of	  a	  typical	  Excel	  form	  wherein	  the	  words	  had	  to	  be	  entered	  during	  the	  paid	  rounds	  1	  and	  2.	  The	  form	  used	  during	  the	  dry	  round	  is	  similar,	  except	  that	  the	  participants	  could	  see	  immediately	  whether	  they	  had	  entered	  the	  correct	  word.	  	  	  	  	  The	  payment	  rule	  differed	  by	  the	  group	  and	  the	  round.	  The	  control	  group	  participants	  received	  1.50	  Euro	  in	  each	  round.	  The	  treatment	  group	  participants	  in	  round	  1	  were	  paid	  per	  word:	  0.20	  Euro	  with	  probability	  0.25,	  zero	  with	  probability	  0.75.	  The	  random	  number	  generator	  was	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  ``winning’’	  words	  each	  of	  which	  attracted	  the	  0.20	  Euro	  payment.	  	  In	  round	  2,	  the	  treatment	  group	  participants	  received	  their	  payment	  only	  if	  the	  total	  number	  of	  winning	  words	  in	  that	  round	  was	  equal	  to	  or	  exceeded	  8.	  These	  payment	  rules	  were	  announced	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  round	  as	  part	  of	  the	  instructions.	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  payments	  per	  round,	  each	  participant	  received	  a	  1.50	  Euro	  show-­‐up	  fee	  plus	  his	  or	  her	  win	  in	  one	  of	  the	  ten	  lotteries	  they	  chose	  in	  the	  Holt	  and	  Laury	  risk	  aversion	  questionnaire.	  They	  were	  asked	  to	  indicate	  their	  lottery	  choices	  in	  a	  simple	  Excel	  form,	  which	  was	  then	  used	  to	  pick	  up	  a	  lottery	  at	  random	  and	  play	  it.	  The	  total	  payments,	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communicated	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  averaged	  at	  6.30	  Euro	  in	  the	  control	  group	  and	  7.00	  Euro	  in	  the	  treatment	  group.	  	  	  	  Section	  A.2.	  The	  detailed	  schedule	  of	  the	  experiment	  	  
Stage	   Duration	  Arrival	  and	  reception	   Approx.	  2	  minutes	  Instructions	  	   Exactly	  5	  minutes	  Unpaid	  training	  round	   Exactly	  3	  minutes	  Break	   Exactly	  5	  minutes	  Round	  1	   Exactly	  5	  minutes	  Break	   Exactly	  5	  minutes	  Round	  2	   Exactly	  5	  minutes	  Break	  	   Exactly	  5	  minutes	  Risk	  aversion	  questionnaire	   Max.	  5	  minutes	  Disbursement	  of	  earnings	  and	  departure	   Approx.	  5	  minutes	  	   	  Total	  duration	   Approx.	  45	  minutes	  	  Note:	  the	  instructions	  for	  rounds	  1,	  2	  and	  the	  risk	  aversion	  questionnaire	  appeared	  30	  seconds	  before	  the	  start	  of	  the	  stage	  in	  question.	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  Section	  A.3.	  Instructions	  to	  participants	  	  Instructions	  to	  the	  treatment	  group	  during	  the	  instructions	  session:	  	  
Dear	  Participant,	  
	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  thank	  you	  for	  showing	  up	  and	  agreeing	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  experiment.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  experiment	  is	  to	  compare	  the	  behavioural	  consequences	  of	  two	  different	  ways	  
of	  paying	  salary.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  paying	  fixed	  wages,	  and	  the	  second	  is	  paying	  per	  unit	  of	  
output	  produced.	  You	  will	  get	  paid	  for	  taking	  part.	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  experimental	  task	  is	  to	  find	  the	  word	  in	  the	  piece	  of	  text	  to	  be	  found	  on	  your	  desk,	  
located	  in	  a	  given	  place	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  Excel	  form	  that	  will	  appear	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  
round.	  In	  general,	  a	  single	  task	  looks	  like	  this:	  "Find	  the	  word	  on	  page	  A,	  line	  B,	  position	  C".	  For	  
example,	  the	  word	  on	  page	  1,	  line	  1,	  position	  2	  in	  this	  piece	  of	  text	  is	  "participant".	  Please	  
note	  that	  every	  word	  counts,	  including	  articles,	  such	  as	  "a"	  or	  "the",	  and	  prepositions,	  such	  as	  
"of".	  The	  words	  linked	  with	  a	  dash,	  count	  individually;	  that	  is,	  "merry-­go-­round"	  consists	  of	  
three	  words.	  Having	  found	  the	  word,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  type	  it	  in	  the	  field	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
given	  task	  number	  in	  the	  Excel	  form.	  Please	  type	  the	  word	  starting	  with	  a	  small	  letter	  (not	  
CAPITAL!)	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  you	  spell	  it	  exactly	  as	  it	  is	  spelled	  in	  the	  text,	  as	  incorrectly	  
spelled	  words	  will	  not	  count.	  	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  experiment	  will	  start	  with	  a	  dry	  round	  for	  training.	  Then	  there	  will	  be	  two	  rounds,	  five	  
minutes	  each,	  with	  five-­minute	  breaks	  between	  the	  rounds,	  followed	  by	  a	  short	  questionnaire	  
about	  your	  risk	  preferences.	  The	  payment	  rules	  vary	  by	  round;	  you	  will	  be	  notified	  of	  them	  in	  
due	  time.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  say	  for	  certain	  how	  much	  you	  will	  earn.	  As	  an	  indication,	  we	  have	  
tried	  doing	  the	  task	  ourselves,	  and	  our	  total	  earnings	  for	  the	  two	  rounds	  were	  between	  3	  and	  4	  
Euros.	  Your	  payment	  will	  be	  ready	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  
	  	  
Thanks	  again	  for	  participating,	  and	  we	  wish	  you	  good	  luck!	  	  
	  	  
The	  Experiment	  team	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  Instructions	  to	  the	  control	  group	  during	  the	  instructions	  session:	  	  
Dear	  Participant,	  
	  	  
First	  of	  all,	  thank	  you	  for	  showing	  up	  and	  agreeing	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  experiment.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  experiment	  is	  to	  compare	  the	  behavioural	  consequences	  of	  two	  different	  ways	  
of	  paying	  salary.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  paying	  fixed	  wages,	  and	  the	  second	  is	  paying	  per	  unit	  of	  
output	  produced.	  You	  will	  get	  paid	  for	  taking	  part.	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  experimental	  task	  is	  to	  find	  the	  word	  in	  the	  piece	  of	  text	  to	  be	  found	  on	  your	  desk,	  
located	  in	  a	  given	  place	  as	  specified	  in	  the	  Excel	  form	  that	  will	  appear	  at	  the	  start	  of	  each	  
round.	  In	  general,	  a	  single	  task	  looks	  like	  this:	  "Find	  the	  word	  on	  page	  A,	  line	  B,	  position	  C".	  For	  
example,	  the	  word	  on	  page	  1,	  line	  1,	  position	  2	  in	  this	  piece	  of	  text	  is	  "participant".	  Please	  
note	  that	  every	  word	  counts,	  including	  articles,	  such	  as	  "a"	  or	  "the",	  and	  prepositions,	  such	  as	  
"of".	  The	  words	  linked	  with	  a	  dash,	  count	  individually;	  that	  is,	  "merry-­go-­round"	  consists	  of	  
three	  words.	  Having	  found	  the	  word,	  you	  will	  have	  to	  type	  it	  in	  the	  field	  corresponding	  to	  the	  
given	  task	  number	  in	  the	  Excel	  form.	  Please	  type	  the	  word	  starting	  with	  a	  small	  letter	  (not	  
CAPITAL!)	  and	  make	  sure	  that	  you	  spell	  it	  exactly	  as	  it	  is	  spelled	  in	  the	  text,	  as	  incorrectly	  
spelled	  words	  will	  not	  count.	  	  	  	  
	  	  
The	  experiment	  will	  start	  with	  a	  dry	  round	  for	  training.	  Then	  there	  will	  be	  two	  rounds,	  five	  
minutes	  each,	  with	  five-­minute	  breaks	  between	  the	  rounds,	  followed	  by	  a	  short	  questionnaire	  
about	  your	  risk	  preferences.	  You	  will	  get	  paid	  1.50	  Euro	  for	  each	  of	  the	  two	  rounds	  of	  the	  
experiment.	  
	  	  
Thanks	  again	  for	  participating,	  and	  we	  wish	  you	  good	  luck!	  	  
	  	  
The	  Experiment	  team	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Instructions	  to	  the	  control	  group	  at	  the	  start	  or	  round	  1:	  
Your	  task	  in	  this	  round	  is	  to	  find	  words	  corresponding	  to	  the	  page,	  line	  and	  order	  number	  as	  
specified	  in	  the	  task	  table	  you	  are	  about	  to	  see.	  The	  layout	  of	  the	  task	  table	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  
the	  dry	  round.	  You	  will	  receive	  a	  fixed	  payment	  of	  €1.50	  for	  this	  round.	  Instructions	  to	  the	  control	  group	  at	  the	  start	  of	  round	  2:	  	  
This	  round	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  previous	  one.	  Just	  keep	  finding	  words,	  and	  you	  will	  receive	  the	  
same	  fixed	  payment	  of	  €1.50	  for	  this	  round	  as	  well.	  Instructions	  to	  the	  treatment	  group	  at	  the	  start	  of	  round	  1:	  
Your	  task	  in	  this	  round	  is	  to	  find	  words	  corresponding	  to	  the	  page,	  line	  and	  order	  number	  as	  
specified	  in	  the	  task	  table	  you	  are	  about	  to	  see.	  The	  layout	  of	  the	  task	  table	  is	  the	  same	  as	  in	  
the	  dry	  round.	  
For	  every	  correctly	  found	  word	  there	  is	  one	  chance	  out	  of	  four	  to	  receive	  €0.20	  and	  three	  out	  
of	  four	  to	  receive	  €0.00.	  The	  one	  chance	  out	  of	  four	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  every	  
fourth	  word	  will	  win,	  or	  that	  one	  in	  every	  four	  words	  will	  win.	  For	  a	  given	  number	  of	  words,	  
there	  may	  be	  more	  or	  less	  than	  a	  quarter	  of	  wins.	  Your	  pay	  for	  this	  round	  is	  the	  number	  of	  
winning	  words	  times	  €0.20.	  Instructions	  to	  the	  treatment	  group	  at	  the	  start	  of	  round	  2:	  
The	  task	  for	  this	  round	  is	  exactly	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  round,	  except	  that	  now	  you	  have	  
to	  score	  at	  least	  8	  (EIGHT)	  winning	  words	  to	  receive	  your	  payment.	  If	  you	  score	  fewer,	  your	  
payment	  for	  this	  round	  will	  be	  €0.00.	  	  Instructions	  for	  filling	  in	  the	  risk	  aversion	  questionnaire:	  
Imagine	  you	  have	  a	  choice	  between	  two	  lotteries:	  A	  and	  B.	  Each	  lottery	  has	  two	  prizes	  that	  can	  
be	  won	  with	  specified	  probabilities.	  The	  table	  below	  lists	  the	  prizes	  and	  the	  corresponding	  
probabilities	  for	  different	  configurations	  of	  the	  lotteries.	  Please	  read	  this	  table	  and	  indicate	  for	  
each	  configuration	  which	  lottery	  you	  would	  choose:	  A	  or	  B.	  Please	  indicate	  your	  choice	  by	  
entering	  1	  in	  the	  Decision	  A	  or	  Decision	  B	  cell	  in	  the	  Excel	  form	  on	  your	  screen.	  Remember:	  one	  
of	  the	  ten	  choices	  you	  will	  make	  will	  be	  picked	  at	  random	  and	  the	  lottery	  you	  have	  chosen	  will	  
be	  played	  to	  you.	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  Section	  A.4.	  Risk	  aversion	  questionnaire:	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  Section	  A.5.	  A	  fragment	  from	  the	  piece	  of	  text	  used	  in	  rounds	  1	  and	  2	  as	  it	  appeared	  to	  the	  participants:	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1. Shortly after my education at college was finished, I happened to be 
2. staying at Paris with an English friend. We were both young men then, and lived, 
3. I am afraid, rather a wild life, in the delightful city of our sojourn. One 
4. night we were idling about the neighborhood of the Palais Royal, doubtful to 
5. what amusement we should next betake ourselves. My friend proposed a visit to 
6. Frascati's; but his suggestion was not to my taste. I knew Frascati's, as the 
7. French saying is, by heart; had lost and won plenty of five-franc pieces there, 
8. merely for amusement's sake, until it was amusement no longer, and was 
9. thoroughly tired, in fact, of all the ghastly respectabilities of such a social 
10. anomaly as a respectable gambling-house. "For Heaven's sake," said I to my 
11. friend, "let us go somewhere where we can see a little genuine, blackguard, 
12. poverty-stricken gaming with no false gingerbread glitter thrown over it all. 
13. Let us get away from fashionable Frascati's, to a house where they don't mind 
14. letting in a man with a ragged coat, or a man with no coat, ragged or 
15. otherwise." "Very well," said my friend, "we needn't go out of the Palais Royal 
16. to find the sort of company you want. Here's the place just before us; as 
17. blackguard a place, by all report, as you could possibly wish to see." In 
18. another minute we arrived at the door, and entered the house, the back of which 
19. you have drawn in your sketch.  
  
20. When we got upstairs, and had left our hats and sticks with the doorkeeper, 
21. we were admitted into the chief gambling-room. We did not find many people 
22. assembled there. But, few as the men were who looked up at us on our entrance, 
23. they were all types--lamentably true types--of their respective classes.  
24. We had come to see blackguards; but these men were something worse. There is 
25. a comic side, more or less appreciable, in all blackguardism--here there was 
26. nothing but tragedy--mute, weird tragedy. The quiet in the room was horrible. 
27. The thin, haggard, long-haired young man, whose sunken eyes fiercely watched the 
28. turning up of the cards, never spoke; the flabby, fat-faced, pimply player, who 
29. pricked his piece of pasteboard perseveringly, to register how often black won, 
30. and how often red--never spoke; the dirty, wrinkled old man, with the vulture 
31. eyes and the darned great-coat, who had lost his last soul, and still looked on 
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  Section	  A.6.	  A	  screenshot	  of	  a	  typical	  Excel	  form	  wherein	  the	  words	  had	  to	  be	  entered	  during	  rounds	  1	  and	  2:	  	  
	  Note:	  The	  word	  entries	  for	  each	  round	  were	  made	  on	  a	  separate	  sheet.	  These	  sheets	  were	  password-­‐protected	  to	  prevent	  the	  participants	  from	  seeing	  them	  before	  they	  received	  the	  password	  from	  the	  experimental	  team.	  All	  cells	  in	  the	  sheets,	  apart	  from	  column	  F	  where	  words	  had	  to	  be	  entered,	  were	  also	  blocked.	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